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Retrospectives 1971: Strategic Organization

Managerial Aspects of Command
John S. Kem and James G. Breckenridge

ABSTRACT: Lieutenant Colonel Harold R. Lamp voiced concerns
in 1971 about the inadequacy of the new defense managerial
analytic framework, operations research/systems analysis, to assess
critical intangibles of military readiness. Fifty years later, Lamp’s
concerns speak to the necessity of including data and effects from
all organizational levels in order to ensure the Army can effectively
coordinate complex systems and develop leaders capable of
managing the same.

T

he opening sentence of “Some Managerial Aspects of
Command,” “A farseeing Army needs to digress now and then
in assessing its performances to make certain it is recording the
lessons which have a great impact for the future” still rings true.1 The
US Army and the Joint Force are in a similar position today as each
organization works to forecast into the late 2020s and 2030s. What are
the key insights from 50 years ago that inform these efforts?
Historical context provides essential clues to Lieutenant Colonel
Harold R. Lamp’s perspectives from 1971. A class of 1970 Army War
College graduate, Lamp was writing as the Army was drawing down
force levels, with approximately 250,000 US troops still in Vietnam
in June 1971. In Europe the Army, under-resourced and with mixed
readiness levels, was down to only 215,000 soldiers from a troop strength
of over 277,000 as recently as 1962. The ominous Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia had occurred only a few years prior, and Army leadership
was increasingly concerned about Warsaw Pact competition and overall
capability relative to NATO.2 The Army of Lamp’s time had an identity
problem, poised as it was at an intellectual crossroads.
The Vietnam War preoccupied military thinking, and as Lamp
wrote, “the feedback, critique, and assimilation of other important if
less spectacular teachings have been dwarfed.”3 The Army’s identity
problem and intellectual struggle at the time was twofold. The Army
of the 1970s was a constabulary Army deeply enmeshed in a strategic
alliance in the heart of Europe, postured defensively and prepared to
conduct conventional and nuclear operations. That same Army was also

1. Harold R. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects of Command,” Parameters 1, no. 1 (Spring 1971):
42, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol1/iss1/6.
2. Hubert Zimmerman, “The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment: America’s Troop
Presence in Europe during the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 3–27,
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.1.3.
3. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 42.
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engaged in conventional and irregular combat in Southeast Asia, with
few allies and diminishing popular and political support at home.
As 1971 unfolded, it seemed certain the United States would maintain
its commitment to NATO defense and withdraw from Vietnam. But
it was far from certain how the Army would train, man, equip, and
organize in a post–Vietnam environment. Who and what the Army
would be and how it would fight remained open, strategic-level questions.
Leadership and management issues flow from any organization with
an identity problem. In the case of the early 1970s Army, these issues
were exacerbated by the uncertainty and challenges posed by defining
the ends, ways, and means needed to balance near-term requirements
and long-term investment prioritization. As American involvement in
the Vietnam War receded—in August of 1972 the last infantry and
artillery units stood down—an ongoing buildup of Soviet conventional
forces continued to pose a serious threat to US and NATO forces.
Thus, the transition out of Vietnam and reorientation toward Europe
activated critical debates about the proper use of military power. If read
through a strictly bureaucratic lens, the pullback from Vietnam, shift to
a one-and-a-half war standard, and emphasis on alliances threatened the
Army’s institutional autonomy and share of budgetary resources. . . . But
that misses the negotiation that took place across the Army. Beyond myopic
bureaucratic struggles, the leaders of the Army accepted a shift in the
international environment and used it as a means of reconceptualizing the
role of land forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.4

Fifty years on, the struggle for identity resurfaces. The early twentyfirst-century US Army, emerging from its long wars in southwest Asia,
confronts what is described as a return to great power competition. All
the while, the rapidly evolving global strategic environment is further
complicated by transnational corporations, climate change, cyber and
space operations, pandemics, and extremist ideologies. A new US Army
uniform, brown but called green, signals a cosmetic back-to-the-future
theme. The uncertainty and identity issues that characterized Lamp’s
world remind us of the present.

Lamp on Command and Management

Early in the article, Lamp highlighted part of his purpose—the
mostly tactical lessons from the crucible of combat operations inevitably
“[dominate] military writing,” at the expense of many wider lessons
and opportunities for professional discussion, including the role of
management at all Army levels.5 Lamp emphasized what he saw as a
significant change in the Army and the nation’s approach to a major
conflict. Using the Vietnam buildup to illustrate, he argued the two
precedents of “(a) the expansion of forces without any significant call-up
of the reserve training base, and (b) the costing of manpower along with
4. Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2016), 30.
5. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 42.
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other resources in determining battlefield means” were “now wedded to
the military” with significant potential impacts.6
In his view the Army’s ability to mobilize for the Vietnam War was
miraculous given its limited resources. Nonetheless this mobilization
required the Army to barter with unknown long-term trade-offs at all
levels, due to the organization’s inability to understand residual effects
far “beyond that recorded numerically in unit readiness reports.” 7 Here
Lamp turned to the identity of the Army and proposed key decision
areas for the coming decade.
Lamp’s personal experiences and frames of reference provide
insight to his perspectives. His service on the Army General Staff, with
the 25th Infantry Division in Vietnam, and as a battalion commander
in Europe drove his focus. Further the US Army War College Lamp
had just graduated from was wrestling with transformative curriculum
changes. The college had embraced management practices; as early
as 1961, “acknowledgement of the McNamara ideas on strategy and
management appeared in the War College curriculum.”8 By the late
1960s and early 1970s, the war in Southeast Asia was creating a crisis
of confidence. “The questions posed so long ago by Tasker Bliss—what
should be taught, to whom, and to how many—fleetingly believed to
have been settled, reappeared in more critical form.”9
Reflecting a major focus on business and analytical approaches, the
War College by 1967 had added a command and management seminar.
“As presented, the course was more concerned with economic analysis,
systems analysis, and automatic data processing than it was with
“command.”10 Systems analysis had expanded from post–Second World
War through the 1960s. It was an integral part of corporate management
and battlefield calculus in the Korean and Vietnam Wars but with mixed
results and viewpoints.11
In February 1970, “the War College initiated a formal review of the
curriculum” that led to sweeping changes focused on the “intellectual
development of the student, specifically the development of his analytical
skills.”12 The 1971–72 resident class program reflected much of the
thinking of the curriculum review. Although international relations
remained a major area of study, the college eliminated The Search
for a National Strategy course and emphasized management skills
through the establishment of the Department of Management and its
revised course, National Defense Decision-Making and Management.13
6. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 42–43.
7. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 43.
8. Harry P. Ball, Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College, rev. ed. (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Alumni Association of the United States Army War College, 1994), 355.
9. Ball, Responsible Command, 355.
10. Ball, Responsible Command, 377.
11. See also Charles R. Shrader, History of Operations Research in the United States Army, Volume 1:
1942–62 (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations
Research), Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 13.
12. Ball, Responsible Command, 399.
13. Ball, Responsible Command, 400.
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Clearly influenced by this trend in management practice and education,
Lamp discusses issues such as “Soldier Intangibles,” “Motivation,” and
“Military Professional Judgment.”

“Assaying Soldier Intangibles”
Lamp argued key senior defense officials and policymakers failed to
appreciate results achieved by unit-level commanders in Vietnam in the
late 1960s and very early 1970s. Importantly, he attributed this failure
to the inability of military leaders to think and write professionally. He
acknowledged the centralized decision-making characteristic of the
military’s “evolved management style” and worried many accompanying
decisions were too focused on cost. Further, cost was only part of the
picture; in the process of concentrating on the explicitly measurable,
“modern defense management style” missed key variables.
Using the then-ongoing debate surrounding the establishment of
an all-volunteer force as an example, Lamp argued more measurable
factors—economic and political—would ultimately prove the most
persuasive in defense management budget decisions, rather than the
true costs of training a completely all-volunteer professional force. As
a result, decisions on whether to end the draft and related readiness
policies would be flawed—a lack of refined analysis prevented accurate
assessments of real impacts to the system such as duration, level of
soldier training, and what Lamp referred to as “the acquisition-half of
quality soldier development.”14

“Management of Motivation”
Lamp discussed the importance of motivation in combat but also in
training, especially experiential event training. He drew lessons from his
time in Europe—with leadership and motivation, even an undermanned
and underequipped unit could succeed. The individual training elements
were less important than leadership and the environment in which the
training occurred. The specific examples Lamp used are disjointed and
less relevant today, and his discussion of the training arch was especially
tactical, nevertheless, his conclusion to this section remains relevant
when considering the Army’s current programming and policy with
respect to training. Lamp asked if training policy overly emphasized
management of instructional resources to the detriment of the
motivational aspects of training and answering the important question,
“how much training is enough?”

“Military Professional Judgment”
In this final, less-developed section, Lamp addressed his view on the
“current differences between command and management even while
recognizing the close relationship between the two.”15 Both elements
were essential for future command even though Lamp had a clear bias
for commanders who continued to make good command decisions
14. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 45.
15. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 48.
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despite a lack of systems analysis skills. He further noted Army schools
were modernizing to help students quickly acquire these early 1970s-era
management skills.

Relevance for Today and Tomorrow

Lamp’s article did not focus on specific solutions to the Army’s
identity crisis. The majority of his article identified the training challenges
of the early 1970s and provided a diagnosis of the management problem
facing Army leaders. But his focus remained far too narrow and tactical.
In 1973, shortly after the publication of Lamp’s article, the Army,
under General Creighton Abrams Jr., implemented Operation Steadfast.
As international relations scholar Benjamin Jensen points out, this
massive internal reorganization plan was designed to streamline
domestic operations and training. “The origins of Steadfast date back to
a series of reviews conducted under chief of staff of the Army William C.
Westmoreland (1968–1972). In particular, William Whipple and John V.
Foley’s ‘Pilot Study on the Department of Army Organization’ and . . .
the follow-up (Charles) Parker Panel outlined the management problems
inherent in the U.S. Army in the late 1960s.”16 Jensen further remarks:
The Parker Panel turned to private industries, including IBM and Xerox, to
see how they dealt with ‘decision making, systems management (horizontal)
vs. functional management (vertical), and the growth of ad hoc committees’.
. . . The post-Vietnam Army would be a smaller professional force operating
in a constrained budgetary environment. More forces would be stationed
at home, thus requiring high levels of unit readiness to facilitate rapid
deployment.17

This effort was the early foundation for the Army that developed
through the 1980s and fought in Iraq and Afghanistan into at least
the early 2000s, a highly capable Army that experienced considerable
tactical and operational success. Moreover as eminent scholar Richard
Betts notes:
Modern conventional military effectiveness has become clearly more a
matter of quality than quantity of forces, and less a matter of pure firepower
than the capacity to coordinate complex systems. The essence of American
superiority is not advanced weapon technology per se. Rather it lies in the
interweaving of capacities in organization, doctrine, training, maintenance,
support systems, integration of surveillance, targeting, and weaponry, and
overall professionalism.18

Yet today as in 1971, the need for more deliberate, in-depth thinking
remains a challenge. Tactical and operational successes are necessary
but insufficient. Like Lamp, senior decisionmakers typically focus too
narrowly, over-emphasizing squad- and platoon-level training, both of
which are foundational critical components of Army basic formations.
16. Jensen, Forging the Sword, 31.
17. Jensen, Forging the Sword, 31.
18. Richard K. Betts, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 174.
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Opportunity costs of such company grade-level emphasis by senior
leaders include devoting less resources and thinking to the areas Betts
highlights: coordinating complex systems and building capability at the
strategic-operational nexus. Reinforcing this point, Antulio Echevarria
asserts there is a:
lack of emphasis on the end game, specifically, on the need for systematic
thinking about the processes and capabilities needed to translate military
victories into strategic successes. . . . The new American way of war . . .
appears geared to fight wars as if they were battles and thus confuses the
winning of campaigns or small-scale actions with the winning of wars.19

Furthermore, the Army has devoted too little analysis, emphasis,
and innovative thinking to the role of Landpower in support of US
efforts in global competition.
The “interweaving of capacities” described by Betts points to a
series of management challenges Army leaders face. For example, Lamp
was both intrigued and frustrated by the burgeoning field of operations
research/systems analysis and how this new analytic model would impact
the effort to build and train the Army. He highlighted the potential
negative impact of analyses that failed to incorporate data and effects at
all organizational levels. That tension remains today. Commander and
organizational decision dynamics are complex, and too few commanders
make the effort to remain literate in the current data environment.
And what would Lamp think of the capability of the current Army
programming example—the Program Evaluation Group—to program?
Undoubtedly he would want to see the multilevel data and analysis
and, from an organizational perspective, examine how the Army
measures the accountability of high-priority programs and addresses
potential moral hazard. Are high-priority programs held accountable in
execution, or is poor management indirectly rewarded with unfunded
requirement bailouts because these programs are “top priority?” Does
the Army analyze the return on investment of some of the lower priority
items relative to highly funded programs in order to ascertain the real
implications of such resourcing decisions, or is the Army instead “forced
to make quick decisions” on an annual basis?
Lamp provided an insightful warning that echoes into the twentyfirst century: “For it is this aspect of defense management that the
decisionmaker—the civilian systems analyst—does not now weigh
in his centralized measurements of military command effectiveness
and requirements.”20
The task ahead for Army leadership mirrors the challenge Lamp
attempted to identify in 1971 and what several contemporary authors
have asserted as the “Army’s professional center of gravity, its sense
19. Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Transforming the Army’s Way of Battle: Revising Our Abstract
Knowledge,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd Matthews (Boston:
McGraw-Hill, 2005), 371.
20. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 49.
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of self.”21 In his seminal book on leadership, James MacGregor Burns
pointed out, “the essence of leadership in any polity is the recognition
of real need, the uncovering and exploiting of contradictions among
values and between values and practice, the realigning of values, the
reorganization of institutions where necessary, and the governance of
change.”22 In response to this formidable expectation, the Army must
develop effective strategic leaders who can bring personnel together,
lead, and serve on teams with expert knowledge, collaborating to
develop innovative solutions.
The Army War College takes this challenge seriously. Spurred on
by a dynamic strategic environment, fundamental changes in higher
education delivery modalities, and a new Joint Chiefs of Staff vision for
professional military education, the Army War College is in the midst
of an ambitious effort of curricular, organizational, and infrastructure
reform. In line with the Joint Chiefs of Staff vision, the War College
has placed a renewed emphasis on active and experiential learning with
methodologies that “include use of case studies grounded in history to
help students develop judgment, analysis, and problem-solving skills,
which can then be applied to contemporary challenges, including war,
deterrence, and measures short of armed conflict.”23
Lamp closed with the observation, “at the Army level we must
find ways and means of influencing the decisionmakers.”24 He inferred
that in his Army, an appreciation of modern management practice
was insufficient and underdeveloped. Fast forward to today and
much the same could be said of Army leader proficiency in strategic
communication informed by knowledge management and data
literacy skills.
Importantly, just as in Lamp’s day but at a more strategic level,
the Army War College curriculum increasingly emphasizes effective
communication and decision making. The key and essential “managerial
aspects of command” are bounded by problem solving, asking the right
questions, and effectively communicating the results to decisionmakers.
These management skills are further augmented by building the
individual additive skills, knowledge, and behaviors necessary to
enable the development of initiative-oriented and innovation-based
organizational cultures grounded in the moral foundations of the
military profession.
As historian Barbara Tuchman—incidentally, the first female
author featured in Parameters—noted, “to a proper understanding of the
cause and effect . . . it must be written in terms of what was known and
21. George B. Forsythe et al., “Professional Identity Development for 21st Century Army
Officers,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd Matthews (Boston:
McGraw-Hill, 2005), 189.
22. James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 43.
23. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Developing Today’s Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War: The Joint
Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education & Talent Management (Washington,
DC: JCS, 2020), 6.
24. Lamp, “Some Managerial Aspects,” 49.
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believed at the time.”25 What will the reader of Parameters in 2071 think
of the efforts at the Army War College, as part of the Army and the Joint
Force, to forecast and prepare for the challenges of the middle half of
the twenty-first century?
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